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Case Notes
TORTS-RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A
AND STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE-An Aircraft Manufacturer
Is Not Liable for Damages Arising from the Crash of an Aircraft
It Had Manufactured in 1952 on the Theories of Negligence, Im-
plied Warranty or Strict Liability for Alleged Defects in the
Adequacy of the Seat Fastenings and the Lack of Fire Protection
When There is No Showing that the Ordinary Consumer Would
Expect a 1952 Aircraft To Have the Safety Features of One Manu-
factured in 1970. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443
(10th Cir. 1976).
This consolidated appeal arose from a United States District
Court Order1 granting defendant-appellee's motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiffs' decedents were passengers and representa-
tives of passengers on a Martin 404 aircraft which had been char-
tered to transport the Wichita State University football team and
a number of supporters to a football game. On October 2, 1970,
the Martin 404 crashed into the mountains, first striking treetops
and then continuing for 425 feet before coming to rest. The impact
caused a number of the seats to be torn loose from their floor attach-
ments and thrown to the front of the aircraft thereby blocking the
exit. The initial impact and ensuing fire resulted in the death of
thirty-two of the forty persons on board. Plaintiffs brought suit
against Martin-Marietta Corporation, the manufacturer of the air-
craft, and Ozark Airlines, the intermediate owner and seller of the
plane.
The plaintiffs did not contend that any action of either defendant
caused the plane to crash. Their claims were that the defendants
failed to design, manufacture, or maintain the plane in crash-
worthy condition and thereby caused the deaths or enhanced the
injuries of the passengers.' The primary claim alleged the in-
'Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 418 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
' Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443, 444 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Bruce].
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adequacy of the seat fastenings.!
The plaintiffs sought to recover on the theories of negligence,
implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. The defendants sought
summary judgment, asserting there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact. The district court concluded that the laws of Mary-
land applied to determine the liability of Martin and those of
Missouri to determine that of Ozark, and this was not challenged
by either party on appeal." The district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's order. Held, affirmed:
An aircraft manufacturer is not liable for damages arising from
the crash of an aircraft it had manufactured in 1952 on the theories
of negligence, implied warranty, or strict liability for alleged de-
fects in the adequacy of the seat fastenings and the lack of fire
protection when there is no showing the ordinary consumer would
expect a 1952 aircraft to have the safety features of one manu-
factured in 1970. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 443
(10th Cir. 1976).
I. BACKGROUND OF STRICT LIABILITY AND
STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE
The concept of strict liability was an American reaction to an
1842 decision by the English Court of Exchequer in Winterbottom
v. Wright' which held that privity between buyer and seller was a
necessary ingredient in a cause of action sounding in torte against
the seller or supplier of a product.!
A celebrated assault upon the doctrine of privity was made by
Justice Cardozo, then sitting on the New York Court of Appeals,
'Id.
41d. at 444-46. In diversity cases the federal courts apply conflict of law
rules which conform to those prevailing in the state courts in which the federal
court is located. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the "significant contacts" test for
conflict of law questions in tort cases. Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla.
1974).
10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
6 The plaintiff contended that due to the defendants' contract with the coach
owner to keep the coach in good repair, the defendants owed a duty to the plain-
tiff coachmen.
7 10 M. & W. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
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in 1916. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' the plaintiff was
allowed recovery in his negligence action against the manufacturer
of a defective automobile without establishing privity. Although
significant, the case was not a panacea for consumers, since it did
not abolish the requirement of privity when the theory of recovery
was breach of warranty.
It was not until 1960 that a court extended the holding of
MacPherson to recoveries based on warranty. In that year, the
landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.' held that
public policy demanded the abolition of the privity requirement.
The result was that a manufacturer could now be liable if he put
a defective product on the market and expected it to reach the
consumer, and the product did, in fact, injure a consumer. The
warranty was no longer impeded by the lack of privity.
The true impetus for modem strict liability theory was espoused
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products1" by Justice Traynor in 1963.
The court stated that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, realizing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a person." The basic approach of the Greenman decision
was incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
402A, which is now the basis for strict liability in many jurisdic-
tions.12 The rapid development of the doctrine undoubtedly created
'217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
1059 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (hereinafter cited
as Greenman).
n 377 P.2d at 900.
12RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965), (hereinafter cited as S
402A). The Restatements are a series of statements of rules of law in certain
subjects, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute. The statement
of a rule is entitled to weight as a product of expert opinion and as of the ex-
pression of the law by the legal profession. See Poretta v. Superior Dowel Co.,
153 Me. 308, 137 A.2d 361, 373 (1957).
The following jurisdictions have either adopted § 402A or cited it with ap-
proval: Alabama, Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Arizona,
Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975); Colorado, Hiigel v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975); Connecticut, Rossignol v. Dan-
bury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549; 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Dela-
ware, Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976); Florida,
Mattes v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 So. 2d 417 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Hawaii,
Stewart v. Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970); Idaho, Shields
v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Illinois, Collins
v. Musgrave, 28 Ill. App. 3d 307, 328 N.E.2d 649 (1975); Indiana, Ayr-Way
1977]
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much of the confusion and vagueness that currently surrounds it."'
One of the several areas that creates such confusion is the state
of the art doctrine. Two aspects of the doctrine seem to present a
problem: the nature of the doctrine itself and the relationship it
has to Section 402A. The first area of confusion is eliminated when
it is realized that there are actually two separate, yet interrelated,
doctrines that are often referred to by the phrase, "state of the art."
A. State of the Art as the Prevailing Custom in the Industry
In an ordinary negligence action it is not uncommon for the
defendant to assert that he has complied with the customs of the
community or industry, and that since he is acting as all others do
under like circumstances, he has conformed to the community's
definition of reasonable conduct and, hence, is not negligent. This
is a recognized, legitimate defense.' However, the standard of care
Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973); Iowa, Hawkeye-
Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Kansas,
Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976); Kentucky, Dealers Transp. Co.,
Inc., v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966); Maryland, Phipps v.
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Minnesota, Mc-
Cormock v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Mississippi,
State Store Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 912 (1966); Missouri, Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo.
1967); Montana, Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 513 P.2d 268 (Mont.
1973), Nebraska, Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601
(1971); Nevada, General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972); New
Hampshire, Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 352 A.2d 723 (N.H. 1976); New Jersey,
Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975);
New Mexico, First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agricultural Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,
537 P.2d 682 (N.M. App. 1975); North Dakota, Johnson v. American Motors
Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974); Ohio, Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d
141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971); Oklahoma, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.,
521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Oregon, Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467,
435 P.2d 806 (1967); Pennsylvania, Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966);
Rhode Island, Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255
(1971); South Dakota, Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d
104 (1973); Tennessee, Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d
240 (1966); Texas, McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967);
Vermont, Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Washington,
Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71
(1976); Wisconsin, Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Other jurisdictions either rely on § 402A for interpretive purposes, have not
addressed the issue, have statutory authority on point, or have rejected the sec-
tion.
"In the wake of Greenman, the law was changing so quickly that the Re-
statement provision, supra note 12, was actually drawn three times. First, it was
made applicable only to food and drink; then it was extended to products for
"intimate bodily use;" and finally, it was made applicable to all products.
1' Low v. Park Price Co., 95 Idaho 91, 503 P.2d 291 (1972); Day v. Barber-
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established by the custom is not conclusive." Justice Holmes stated
the rule to be: "What usually is done may be evidence of what
ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard
of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or
not.""' In a negligence action, therefore, a defendant may establish
a prima facie defense by showing his compliance with the custom
(or state of the art). The plaintiff then is obligated to prove that
the industry's custom is negligent."7
In strict liability cases, the custom variety of state of the art
evidence has often met stiff resistance. 8 An Illinois court bluntly
stated that a defendant could not avoid strict liability by showing
that it had conformed to the industry custom.1 The logical in-
tegrity of this holding is readily apparent. Under Section 402A, a
manufacturer may be liable despite the standard of care he has
used. Therefore, the custom-type state of the art evidence is irrele-
vant when introduced to establish a defendant's standard of care
in a products liability action.
B. State of the Art as the Limit of Technological Capability
Scientific knowledge may, at any time, limit the ability of a man-
ufacturer to develop a safer product. Evidence introduced to
Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956); Murphy v. Messer-
schmidt, 41 Ill. App. 3d 659, 355 N.E.2d 78 (1976).
15See Southern New England Tel. Co. v. D'Addario Constr. Co., 33 Conn.
Sup. 596, 363 A.2d 766 (1976); Broadview Leasing Co. v. Cape Central Air-
ways, 539 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. App. 1976); Marsh Wood Prods. Co. v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932).
16 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903). Stated differently:
"[I]t is not of itself negligence to use a particular design or method in the manu-
facture or handling of a product . . .which is reasonably safe and in customary
use in the industry, although other possible designs... might be conceived which
would be safer .... ." Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135
N.E.2d 231, 238 (1956).
17 Judge Learned Hand stated in The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932), that though customs may be evidence of the reasonable standard of care,
"courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative
that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission."
"
8See Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Atkins
v. American Motors, Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala. 1976); Matthews v. Stewart,
20 Ill. App. 3d 470, 314 N.E.2d 683 (1974).
19 "[Dlefendants in the instant case [cannot] avoid the issue of strict liability
by attempting to show merely that they had done what the rest of their industry
had done to make their products safe." Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill.
App. 3d 604, 609, 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (1973). See Karasik, State of the Art of
Science: Is it a Defense to Products Liability?, 60 ILL. B.J. 348 (1972).
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show that such a constraint exists is the second variety of state of
the art evidence. Unlike the custom-type of state of the art evi-
dence, most courts have not hesitated to accept this evidence in
strict liability actions,"0 the primary exception to this rule being the
State of Illinois."
The Supreme Court of Illinois firmly held in Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hospital that the practical or scientific impos-
sibility of discovering or removing a defect from a product is not
a defense to an action based on strict liability." For this reason,
state of the art evidence is wholly irrelevant to the consideration of
the defendant's liability. Contrary to the Illinois decisions, most
courts will not impose liability on a manufacturer who has used
all available skill and knowledge to manufacture his product."
C. The Incorporation of State of the Art Evidence into
Section 402A
Section 402A provides that a manufacturer may be liable even
when he has "exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of the product."' This phrase notwithstanding, there are two
methods developed by the courts to incorporate state of the art
evidence into a Section 402A case.
1. The "Comment K" Approach
The first approach is to give an expansive reading to the excep-
tion provided in the section for unavoidably unsafe products. ' As
2 Hines v. St. Joseph Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974); Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
21 See Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Il1.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d
897 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Cunningham) and Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co.,
10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
22 266 N.E.2d at 897. See Karasik, supra note 19.
2 2E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So.2d 898 (1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974); Hines v. St. Joseph Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075
(1974); La Monica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43, 355 N.E.2d
533 (1976).
§ 402A, supra note 12.
Comment k to S 402A reads:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field
of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious
and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease
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stated in Comment k to Section 402A, the primary purpose of
the exception is to exempt the drug industry from the section.' In
Hines v. St. Joseph Hospital," the New Mexico Court of Appeals
was confronted with a factual situation practically identical to the
one presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in Cunningham. Not
only did the Hines court refuse to impose liability on the defendant,
it severely criticized the Cunningham opinion. 8 In E. R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc. v. Stickney," the court held that a fifteen percent
failure rate in a bone transplant product did not warrant the im-
position of liability on the defendant when the manufacturing pro-
cess represented the highest degree of reliability attainable at the
time of manufacture."0 Comment k has also been used in non-drug
cases when, "commercial products [possess] both unparalled (sic)
utility and unquestioned danger." 1 This approach of incorporating
state of the art evidence is somewhat restricted by the comment's
imposition of a duty to warn the recipient of the danger involved."
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the un-
avoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warn-
ing, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is
true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for
this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular
of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can
be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients,
but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of
the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they are proper-
ly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for un-
fortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and de-
sirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
Id.
27 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075 (1974).
28 527 P.2d at 1077.
29274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). This case is based upon breach
of an implied warranty, not on Section 402A; however, there is little practical
difference between the two theories.
201d. at 901.
82 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
12 See cases cited supra note 21.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. The "Defective" Approach
The other approach used by the courts is to allow the introduc-
tion of state of the art evidence to establish that the product was
not defective.' The ease with which this is done depends to a great
extent on the court's definition of "defective." The necessity of
developing a definition which will be easily applied to the facts
of any case was recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co."
a. Definition of "Defective" as Derived from Section 402A
As the Oregon Supreme Court has aptly noted, courts have con-
tinuously floundered in their attempts to develop a workable defini-
tion for defective.' One definition used is derived from the com-
ments to the Restatement and describes "defective" in terms of
the ordinary consumer's expectation." This approach is illustrated
in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., " wherein the court
stated "those products are defective which are dangerous because
they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected."'
"See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
See also Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1976); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1976). See Murray,




, Comment g to S 402A defines "defective condition" by stating in part:
"The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time
it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."
Comment i, in defining "unreasonably dangerous," states: "The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to its characteristics."
There is a significant relationship between the two Comments since they both
define their respective phrases in terms of the "contemplation of the ordinary
consumer."
The "terms 'defective condition' and 'unreasonably dangerous' are essentially
synonymous." Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
3742 111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
3' 247 N.E.2d at 403. Similarly, Jackson v. City of Biloxi, 272 So. 2d 654,
656 (Miss. 1973) stated the principle of law that, "Ordinarily, . . . 'defective
condition' means that the article . . . did not function as expected." (quoting
State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss. 1966)).
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b. Definition of "Defective" as Developed by Wade
Dean John Wade has proposed an alternative definition for de-
fective which consists of seven considerations that should be bal-
anced in what is primarily a benefit-risk analysis to determine the
presence or absence of a manufacturer's liability."' These considera-
"Dean Wade proposed that the term "not reasonably safe" should be used
instead of "defective." However, this paper will attribute Dean Wade's analysis
to the term "defective" since it is not the term used to describe the condition of
the product that is important, but the definition of the condition.
Dean Wade's definition consists of the following factors:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the avail-
ability of other and safer products to meet the same need, (3) the
likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (4) the obvious-
ness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public ex-
pectation of the danger (particularly for established products),
(6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (in-
cluding the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability
to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness
of the product or making it unduly expensive.
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Wade].
In a later article, Professor Wade explained that the test used is similar to
negligence except that scienter is conclusively presumed. Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973). The question
then becomes "whether the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous con-
dition of the product was outweighed by the social utility attained by putting it
out in this fashion." Id. at 835. To help in this determination, Wade, once again,
presents his seven points in a slightly altered style:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet
the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too ex-
pensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awarness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowl-
edge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence
of suitable warnings or instructions.(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spread-
ing the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.
Id. at 837-38.
Other authors have also addressed the problem, including: Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton,
Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and De-
sign of Products, 20 SYACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Fischer, Products Liability-
The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974).
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tions include: (1) the usefulness and desirability of the product,
that is, its utility to the user and to the public as a whole;" (2)
the safety aspects of the product, that is, the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury;- 1 (3) the
availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe;' (4) the manufacturer's ability to
eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing
its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; '
(5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product;" (6) the user's anticipated awareness of the
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of
general public knowledge; ' and (7) the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warning or instructions."
Each of the factors listed above has received some recognition
in the courts. A recent federal district court decision, Bowman v.
General Motors," treated the entire analysis at length, while other
courts have embraced aspects of it with differing degrees of em-
phasis." In Dorsey v. Yoder," the court cited Section 402A as
well as Dean Wade and concluded that the Wade approach pro-
vided a more distinct solution." Against the background of various
factual settings, several state courts have likewise adopted the
Wade definition. 1 Less comprehensive applications and treatments
of the Wade approach or similar approaches can be found in other
opinions."2 State of the art evidence would seem to be implicitly
'0See Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973).41 See Robbins v. Alberto Culver Co., 210 Kan. 147, 499 P.2d 1080 (1972).
2Sutkowshi v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749
(1972).
'Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972).
"See David v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
41 Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967).
"See Zambrana v. Standard Oil Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 209, 102 Cal. Rptr.
699 (1972).
V427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
4See notes 40-46 supra.
'331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
5id. at 760.
"1 Roach v. Kononen Ford Motors Co., 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125, 128
(1974); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976); John-
son v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132, 136-37 (1976).
5Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d
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considered under the Wade definition, especially the availability of
safer substitute products. 3
In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products," the Fifth Circuit found
the two approaches to be interrelated. The court stated that the
"fulcrum for this balancing process [Wade] is the reasonable man
as consumer or as seller."' This blending of approaches instills the
theoretical "ordinary consumer" with some practical analytical
tools and allows the application of the Wade approach to enjoy a
presumption of legitimacy by its association with Section 402A.
To summarize, most courts allow the introduction and considera-
tion of state of the art evidence in strict liability actions. Comment k
to Section 402A provides one method of entry; the requirement of a
"defective" product provides another. When a court incorporates state
of the art evidence by the "defective" route, the definition used for
"defective" determines the method of assimilation.
II. ANALYSIS OF BRUCE V. MARTIN-MARIETTA CORPORATION
Against this background the Tenth Circuit rejected the assertions
advanced by the planitiffs. The plaintiffs' first contention was that
the defendant had not manufactured the aircraft so as to minimize
the possibility of fire occurring after a crash." In an affidavit sub-
mitted in support of their motion for summary judgment, Martin
set forth specific precautions the company had taken to diminish
the possibility of fire. Since the plaintiffs did not respond to this
affidavit the court disposed of their contention on procedural
grounds."7
The plaintiffs' second contention was that the seats and seat
fastenings in the aircraft were not designed or manufactured to
252 (5th Cir. 1973); Helene Curtis Indus. Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,
269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
"' See note 39 supra.
54493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
aId. at 1088.
'8 544 F.2d at 446.
67 "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be en-
tered against him." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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withstand a crash." The plaintiffs relied principally upon the
opinion of their expert witness which indicated that the crash would
have been survivable if seats in common use on October 2, 1970,
had been installed in the airplane." Plaintiffs argued that the
availability of safer aircraft seats eighteen years after the manu-
facture of the Martin 404 established the fact that the plane was
defective at the time it was manufactured, absent an alteration of
the plane when the new seats became available. In support of this
position, plaintiffs relied upon the decisions in Pryor v. Lee C.
Moore Corp." and Mickle v. Blackmon." The court summarily
dismissed these cases as irrelevant." The court then noted that the
decisions in Cunningham" and Gelsumino v. E. W. Bliss Co." sup-
ported the plaintiffs' contention that state of the art evidence is not
relevant to a strict liability claim. The court refused to adopt these
decisions, however, noting that the states whose law applied to the
instant case had not followed the Illinois courts." The court
proceeded to analyze the different burden of proof requirements
established by various jurisdictions for Section 402A cases."' From
the numerous authorities and the Restatement, the court gleaned
a general requirement that a defective product be dangerous be-
yond the expectation of the ordinary consumer. The court then
held that state of the art evidence had been properly received and
considered in that it was helpful in determining the expectation of
the ordinary consumer."
After it decided to allow state of the art evidence in the con-
sideration of the case, the court resorted to the Restatement for a
definition of "defective." The court explained its reasoning process
in the application of state of the art evidence as follows:
61544 F.2d at 445-46.
59 Id. at 446.
60262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958).
61166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
62 544 F.2d at 447. The court stated that "these cases hold that prolonged
safe use of a product is evidence of lack of defect but is not conclusive. We have
no quarrel with the rule but have no need to apply it here." Id. at 447.
"47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
"10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973).
544 F.2d at 447.6Id. at 448.
6I Id. at 447.
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State-of-art evidence helps to determine the expectation of the
ordinary consumer. A consumer would not expect a Model T to
have the safety features which are incorporated in automobiles
made today. The same expectation applies to airplanes. Plaintiffs
have not shown that the ordinary consumer would expect a plane
made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in 1970."
In so explaining itself, the court followed the decisions which rely
on the Restatement and ignored the definition for "defective" de-
veloped by Dean Wade and most recently embraced by the Bowman
court." The court held that because the plaintiffs had not submitted
proof which was sufficient to establish that the ordinary consumer
would expect a plane manufactured in 1952 to have safety features
of one manufactured in 1970, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment had been properly granted."0
The "ordinary consumer's expectation" definition of "defective"
has not been without its critics." Although various criticisms have
been voiced, there appears to be an underlying impression that the
term is subject to misconstruction. The Tenth Circuit's use of state
of the art evidence in conjunction with the "ordinary consumer"
definition adds a new dimension to the confusion already present.
The court's Model T illustration quoted above is agreeable. The
"ordinary consumer . . . with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community"' probably could describe differences he would
expect in a 1970 car and a Model T. However, most cases pre-
sented to the courts today more closely resemble the instant
case; the questions are much more complex. The "ordinary con-
sumer" probably has no idea what safety features to expect in air-
craft from one year to the next. To correct this problem, the Tenth
Circuit imputes to the "ordinary consumer" technological data re-
garding the intricacies of aircraft design. Given the technological
information, which may exceed the knowledge of any particular
Id. at 447.69 1t should be noted that the Bowman opinion was entered subsequent to the
Bruce decision.
70 544 F.2d at 448.T1See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339, 349 (1974); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability; The Meaning of "Defect"
in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 572
(1969).
72 544 F.2d at 443.
5 § 402A, Comment i, supra note 36.
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expert, the ordinary consumer is now ready to form his expecta-
tion. The distortion of the term "ordinary consumer" is obvious.
The reason for the distortion is anything but obvious. On the heels
of distortion comes confusion, which possibly explains a recent
interpretation of the Bruce case. The author stated that the court
was satisfied the aircraft was not unreasonably dangerous accord-
ing to the state of the art of aircraft manufacture in 1952, "even
though today's consumer might reasonably expect safer designs and
conditions."'7
It is submitted that it is time to rid ourselves of the fictitious
perspective attributed to the "ordinary consumer." The imposition
of state of the art evidence on the consumer overloads the term
"ordinary" to an extent that stretches credibility.75 It is not that the
fiction, in practice, is necessarily unmanageable, for an adept court
can reach a valid judgment by using it. But it seems pointless to
perpetuate the resulting confusion and vagueness when Dean
Wade's objective factor approach offers a suitable substitute."8
Implicit in the Wade formula is the consideration of the tech-
nological state of the art. If the technology required to make a
safety change advocated by a plaintiff is non-existent at the time
of manufacture, it is obvious that the manufacturer does not pos-
74W.H. Quirk III and R.K. Harrison, Recent Developments in Aviation
Law, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 349 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Quirk]. Mr. Quirk
was a speaker at the 1977 Journal of Air Law and Commerce Symposium. In
his oral elaboration on the case, he commented that he could not understand
how the Tenth Circuit reached the decision it did.
'5 The classic example of a term stretched to the point of nonrecognition is
"foreseeability." In each case, the courts are faced with the same policy decision;
namely, the extent to which liability will be extended.
78 It should not be assumed that this author believes Dean Wade's approach
to be the only substitute. See note 39 supra.
Mr. Justice Marshall's comments on the wisdom of using unarticulated tests
are well stated in the context of an equal protection case.
But there are problems with deciding cases based on factors not
encompassed by the applicable standards. First, the approach is
rudderless, affording no notice to interested parties of the standards
governing particular cases and giving no firm guidance to judges
who, as a consequence, must assess the constitutionality of legis-
lation before them on an ad hoc basis. Second, and not unrelated-
ly, the approach is unpredictable and requires holding this Court
to standards it has never publicly adopted. Thus, the approach pre-
sents the danger that . . . relevant factors will be misapplied or ig-
nored.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
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sess the "ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product,"
one of the Wade considerations."' It is not so obvious that the




The application of the Wade analysis will probably render few
changes in actual result. It is possible to assume that the courts
have always balanced many, if not all, of Dean Wade's factors in
their determination of the "ordinary consumer's" expectations. 9
The Wade formula, however, has a number of distinct advantages.
First, it would add some needed precision to the presentation of
a products liability case. It is arguably much simpler to gather,
organize, and present the facts of a case on the basis of the Wade
definition than from the perspective of the "ordinary consumer."
Additionally, the very wording of the factors tends to eliminate the
confusion between the custom and technological varieties of state
of the art evidence. Finally, it properly presents the problem as a
social policy question. The ultimate question then becomes, at what
point will society decide that a product must be made safer?
There appears to be no compelling reason for the courts to con-
tinue to work behind the guise of the ordinary consumer. The con-
fusion and imprecision generated by this perspective far out-
weigh any real or imagined benefits gained. The mere fact that
this approach has been embodied in the comments to Section
402A should in no way inhibit the courts from adopting a healthier
approach to a cause of action sorely in need of remedy.
J. Mitchell Bell
7 Wade, supra note 39. Sutkowshi v. Universal Marion Corp., does, in fact,
incorporate technological state of the art evidence with an analysis similar to the
Wade approach.
7" Quirk, supra note 74. To aid in the analysis of the Bruce case, it should
be noted that the deposition of plaintiff's expert witness disclosed that the seats
referred to in the affidavit were not available in 1952.
"See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974). See also Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
Tabert, 542 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1975).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - INSPECTION POWERS - CAB
Agents May, Without Formal Process, Inspect Only Those Records
in the Possession of a Regulated Air Carrier Which Are Reasonably
Relevant to an Investigation Within the CAB's Jurisdiction. CAB
v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976).
In April, 1975, Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) agents with
proper credentials' appeared at the executive offices of United Air-
lines (United) in Elk Grove, Illinois, and demanded immediate ac-
cess to all records and documents on the premises pursuant to sec-
tion 407(e) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' The agents re-
fused to disclose the subject of their investigation, although they
conceded when questioned that it might be at least partially con-
cerned with illegal corporate campaign contributions During their
initial contact with United, the CAB agents agreed to limit their
inspection request to cover four types of files from six of United's
major departments and offices.' After permitting the agents to begin
inspecting some of these files over a period of two days, United for-
mally objected that the inspection exceeded the agent's lawful
authority, and the agents left.' The CAB then filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking
ISee 14 C.F.R. § 240.1-2 (1976).
172 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. S 1377(e) (Supp. V 1975), formerly
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973. Section 407(e) provides
in part:
The Board shall at all times have access to all lands, buildings,
and equipment of any air carrier or foreign air carrier and to all ac-
counts, records, and memorandums, including all documents, pa-
pers, and correspondence, now or hereafter existing, and kept or re-
quired to be kept by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or ticket
agents and it may employ special agents or auditors, who shall have
authority under the orders of the Board to inspect and examine any
and all such lands, buildings, equipment, accounts, records, and
memorandums.
2 CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 395 (7th Cir. 1976). United's
chief executive officer, E. E. Carlson, had admitted making a "personal, legal"
contribution of more than $20,000 to the Committee for the Reelection of the
President, but denied that there had been any illegal corporate contributions by
United. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1975, at 45, col. 2.
"The agents sought to inspect reading files, subject matter files, expense re-
ports, and memoranda from United's Finance and Planning, Law, External Af-
fairs, and Marketing departments and offices of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman.
CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1325, 1325-26 nn.5-7.
'Brief for Appellant at 5, CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th
Cir. 1976).
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through injunction to gain "immediate and unconditional access"
to all of United's records.' At the time the district court heard cross-
motions for summary judgment, the parties were in some dispute
as to whether the unlimited or the limited demand was before the
court.! Even on the basis of the limited request, however, the dis-
trict court found United entitled to summary judgment and or-
dered the CAB's complaint dismissed.! The CAB appealed. Held,
affirmed: CAB agents may, without formal process, inspect only
those records in the possession of a regulated air carrier which are
reasonably relevant to an investigation within the CAB's jurisdic-
tion.' Because the CAB had not specified any investigative purpose
in this case, no determination of reasonable relevance could be
made and the CAB could not have judicial enforcement of its de-
mands.
In seeking unconditional access to United's files without offering
any explanation of its demand, the CAB prompted the first court
test requiring construction of section 407(e) and consideration of
any constitutional problems it might raise. The key holding of the
district court was its interpretation of the phrase in section 407 (e)
which refers to records "kept or required to be kept"; to avoid what
it termed a serious possibility of conflict with the fourth amend-
ment,' the court read the statute as reaching only those documents
"in the specific categories of records the CAB requires" and records
which directly relate to or support those specifically required.1 The
effect of this construction was to place beyond the CAB's reach a
wide variety of correspondence and memoranda not directly related
to required bookkeeping.
In arriving at its narrow construction of section 407(e), the dis-
trict court was able to distinguish two earlier cases which had up-
held CAB investigative demands less sweeping than the one at issue
' CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 399 F. Supp. at 1325. The language of the
CAB's petition closely paralleled that of section 407(e), supra note 2.
The district court based its decision on the limited request, not wishing to
issue an "advisory opinion" on the propriety of a demand the CAB might not
actually be pursuing. 399 F. Supp. at 1325 n.4.
'399 F. Supp. at 1325.
'542 F.2d 394. For elaboration of the "reasonable relevance" standard, see
text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
1 399 F. Supp. at 1328.
" Id. at 1327.
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in the principal case.1" The district court also pointed out that the
CAB has subpoena powers under section 1004(b) of the Act,"
and reasoned that this section would be inconsistent with section
407 (e) if the reach of the latter were as broad as the CAB con-
tended. '
For its controlling precedent, the district court relied on a simi-
lar holding in Burlington Northern, Inc. v. ICC.5 In that case, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (1CC) sought access to Burling-
ton's confidential earnings forecasts. The ICC had attempted to ob-
tain this information in connection with congressional committee
hearings on railroad loan-guarantee legislation.' The ICC relied on
section 20(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act,' which served as
a model for section 407(e) of the Aviation Act." As did the dis-
trict court in the principal case, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Burlington gave a restrictive reading to the
broad language: documents "kept or required to be kept" were
only those included in or directly related to required financial rec-
ords.
1' CAB v. Blatz Airlines, Inc., Civ. No. 13821-61-5 (S.D. Cal. 1962), in-
volved a request for specific documents required by law to be kept by the carrier;
CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957), enforced a CAB demand in subpoena
form. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in the principal case
found it necessary to discuss the CAB's interpretation of section 407(e) in Basler
Flight Service, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, CAB Order Nos. 72-4-153, 154
(Apr. 28, 1972), cited in Brief for Appellant at 31, which also involved a much
less sweeping demand than that in the principal case, and shed very little light on
the proper scope of the statutory language.
1349 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1970); see 14 C.F.R. SS 305.1-.12 (1976).
4 
"It would be difficult to impute to Congress an intent to provide a formal
proceeding for investigation and then to allow the CAB to conduct a complete
investigation in derogation of the requirements and protections afforded by the
formal procedure." 399 F. Supp. at 1327.
- 462 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir.), reh. en banc denied by an equally divided court,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
16462 F.2d at 288 n.1.
1149 U.S.C. § 20(5) (1970).
1 542 F.2d at 396.
"The court found that the purpose of section 20:
is to maintain a uniform accounting system and to permit the analy-
sis and interpretation of records which are required to be kept by
carriers. The Commission's access to memoranda and other ma-
terials in the possession of carriers must therefore be confined to
circumstances in which the need for information relating to or ex-
planatory of required accounting and bookkeeping entries is evident.
462 F.2d at 287-88.
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The Burlington court, in turn, went back to a 1915 decision for
its primary support. In United States v. Louisville and Nashville
R.R.,"' the United States Supreme Court held that an early version
of section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act did not confer on the
ICC authority to inspect the railroad's correspondence. Section 20,
which at that time referred to "accounts, records and memoranda,"
was held to cover only those documents "such as are kept in the
system of bookkeeping to be prescribed by the Commission."21 The
Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to grant a more
sweeping power, one which might be of questionable constitution-
ality, it could have used language "adequate to that purpose. '
The language of section 20 has been broadened by amendment
twice since 1915," the first time in direct response to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Louisville and Nashville." Although the Burling-
ton court conceded that these amendments brought "certain ma-
terials" within the score of the section which had previously been
beyond the ICC's reach,' the court found that there had been no
change in the "basic design and purpose" of the section since
1915." The purpose of section 20. remaining unchanged, the nar-
row construction of Louisville and Nashville continued to control."
Only those materials which were part of or directly related to the
ICC's prescribed "uniform system of accounting" were within the
ICC's reach under section 20(5)."
This rather questionable reading of the legislative history by the
court of appeals panel which originally heard the Burlington case
was sharply challenged in an accompanying opinion on the ICC's
20236 U.S. 318 (1915).
"Id. at 334.
22 Id. at 336.
"3The Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 493, expanded section 20
to cover "documents, papers, and correspondence .. . kept or required to be
kept." The Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899, 917, substituted for
the phrase "kept or required to be kept by carriers" a reference to materials
in the possession "of any person controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with" a carrier. Although section 407(e) of the Aviation Act was mod-
eled on the pre-1940 language, neither the district court nor the court of appeals
saw any distinction in this difference.
24H.R. REP. No. 456, 66th CONG., 1st SEss. 30 (1919).
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motion for rehearing. Although rehearing en banc was denied by
an equally divided court, Judge Leventhal and three of his brethren
joined in a strongly worded statement as to why rehearing should
have been granted. ' Judge Leventhal argued that: 1) the decision
in Louisville and Nashville had served to avoid a constitutional
problem since resolved through much less restrictive statutory in-
terpretations;' 2) Congress had specifically rejected the Louisville
and Nashville decision; 1 and 3) the Louisville and Nashville deci-
sion might not control Burlington on the facts of the latter under
any circumstances. 2 In sum, Judge Leventhal labelled the panel
decision in Burlington "so doubtful that we think it should be va-
cated and reconsidered en banc."
In reviewing the district court's decision in the principal case,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted Judge Leven-
thal's criticisms of the Burlington decision2' and rejected the district
court's interpretation of section 407 (e),' even though the dismissal
of the CAB's complaint was affirmed.' Declining to choose between
the virtually unlimited inspection power claimed by the CAB and
the very narrow authority recognized by the district court, the court
of appeals sought a middle ground. In doing so, the court concerned
itself with those cases since Louisville and Nashville which have
considered the authority of government agencies to investigate cor-
porations and inspect their records.
The Louisville and Nashville decision was one of a number of
cases in which the Supreme Court construed statutes so as to avoid
potential conflicts with the fourth amendment while expressly re-
serving the question whether that amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked by corpora-
tions." More recent cases dealing with the problem, however, were
11 Id. at 288.
"See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
3
1 See note 24 supra.
32462 F.2d at 289-90.
33 d. at 290.
" 542 F.2d at 397.
3ld. at 401.
-"Id. at 403.
37 See, inter alia, United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); FTC v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
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much less restrictive than Louisville and Nashville, limiting gov-
ernment visitorial powers with respect to corporations only by im-
posing a requirement of reasonableness on agency demands." "The
gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that
the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."3 When applied
to corporations, this rule of reason proved considerably less rigor-
ous than with respect to individuals. The courts might enforce gov-
ernment demands for corporate records even when those demands
were based on "nothing more than official curiosity,"' although
mere "fishing expeditions ' 1 would not be judicially countenanced.
It has finally been established within the past few years that the
fourth amendment does apply to corporations,' but it appears to
offer them little more protection now that it is applied than it did
when it was being avoided. The same basic standard of reasonable-
ness continues to be applied,' so that the practical impact of its
formal recognition in this context has been minor. The controlling
question in every case will still be whether the inspection power as-
serted by a government agency is "reasonable."
There are at least two recent cases which could be read as sup-
porting the reasonableness of the sort of sweeping inspection pow-
ers contended for by the CAB in the principal case. In Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States," the Supreme Court stated that
although "the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules
apply," in the context of an industry "long subject to close super-
88 [N]either incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an
unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.
While they may and should have protection from unlawful de-
mands made in the name of public investigation, corporations
can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy ...
... [I]t is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought
is reasonably relevant.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted).
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. at 208.
'
0 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
41 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. at 306.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970); Cali-
fornia Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 60-63 (1974).
43 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 67; SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1055 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
915 (1974).
-397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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vision and regulation... Congress has broad authority to fashion
standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures."' In that
case, however, a six-member majority of the Court found that Con-
gress had not authorized forcible, warrantless seizure of contraband
from a federally licensed liquor dealer."
The Court carried the reasoning of Colonnade a step further in
United States v. Biswell4 There, the Court sustained the seizure
without a warrant of illegal weapons found in the locked storeroom
of a federally licensed gun dealer. The seizure had been made with-
out any use of force under the authority of section 923 (g) of the
Gun Control Act of 1968. The minimal weight given to Fourth
Amendment considerations by the Court in this case is worthy of
note:
[I]f the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effec-
tive, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable of-
ficial conduct under the Fourth Amendment.
... [W]here, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent fed-
eral interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to pri-
vacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may pro-
ceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute."
In its appeal of the principal case, the CAB argued that a broad
reading of section 407(e) would further an "urgent federal inter-
est," and that regulated carriers are in much the same situation
with respect to their fourth amendment rights as were the regu-
lated dealers in Colonnade and BiswellY The court of appeals re-
jected this argument, finding that the "evils at hand"'" were "not
sufficiently analogous" for those cases to control."
Having thus rejected both the district court's reading of the sta-
tute and that contended for by the CAB, the court of appeals
turned to its own consideration of the place occupied by section
"Id. at 77.
"Id.
4406 U.S. 311 (1972).
"82 Stat. 1213, 18 U.S.C. S 923(-g) (1970).
0406 U.S. at 316-17.
50542 F.2d at 399; Brief for Appellant at 43-44.
51542 F.2d at 399.
52 Id.
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407 (e) in the overall scheme of the Act. The court noted the place-
ment of the section "in the midst of an enumeration of CAB's eco-
nomic regulatory powers,"53 and concluded that the purpose of the
section was to further the exercise of those powers." In view of the
fact that the CAB's economic regulatory authority "is not plen-
ary," the court found that authority inadequate to support a plen-
ary inspection power." Having said that much, the court also de-
clined to adopt the district court's restrictive view of the power
conferred by section 407(e): "[I]n adopting § 407(e), Congress
intended to give the Board power to investigate any subject proper-
ly within its jurisdiction and to inspect any carrier records reason-
ably relevant to such an investigation.""' The court thus adopted
the reasoning of those cases typified by United States v. Morton
Salt Co.,' applying it in this case to a regulated carrier rather than
an unregulated corporation.
In reaching its conclusion as to the breadth of section 407 (e),
the court of appeals rejected the reasoning of the district court that
a broad inspection power under section 407 (e) would be incon-
sistent with the subpoena power granted by section 1004(b).', The
appellate court reasoned that forcing the CAB to resort to its sub-
poena power "would result in delay and some loss of flexibility,""
and suggested that the primary purpose of the subpoena power is
to enable the CAB to obtain information from persons not subject
to regulation under the Act or inspection under section 407(e).'
Having construed section 407(e) to reach all carrier records
"reasonably relevant" to a proper investigation, the court turned
briefly to a consideration of the inspection procedures mandated by
earlier cases elaborating this "reasonably relevant" standard."' Pri-
53 Id. This section of the opinion also reviews the legislative history of section




57 Id. at 401-02.
" See cases cited notes 37-38 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
40 542 F.2d at 402.
611 d. n.10.
"' See cases cited note 37 supra and United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48,
57-58 (1964).
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mary jurisdiction to determine what records are reasonably relevant
to a CAB investigation lies with the agency. 3 Nonetheless, because
a demand for inspection must relate to a "proper investigative pur-
pose, the Board must of course have such a purpose" and "must dis-
close its purpose" to allow judicial review." When seeking judicial
enforcement of an inspection demand, the CAB "need not meet any
standard of probable cause."" A fairly minimal showing of four
basic facts will suffice: "that the investigation will be conducted
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant
to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within
the [agency's] possession, and that the administrative steps required
by the [governing statute] have been followed."" The underlying
standard is one of abuse of discretion: because the authority of the
court is invoked to compel compliance with the agency demand,
the court "may not permit its process to be abused."6 The burden
of showing abuse rests on the party resisting the government's de-
mand. '
In the principal case, having failed to disclose what investigative
purpose, if any, motivated its demand for access to United's files,
the CAB had made it impossible for either the district court or the
court of appeals to enforce that demand.6' Although the court of
appeals reads into section 407 (e) a great deal more authority than
did the district court, the power conferred by the section still falls
short of a general warrant to be exercised on the CAB's ipse dixit.
It can be argued, however, that the statutory construction arrived
at might hamper the CAB undesirably in the exercise of its man-
date to monitor the economic affairs of air carriers. The require-
ment of "reasonable relevance" to a "proper investigative purpose"
is not overly stringent on its face. Its practical impact, however,
could be to frustrate the CAB in efforts to search out irregularities
in the carriers' affairs.
63 542 F.2d at 402 n.10 (citing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. at 214-16).
542 F.2d at 402.
"United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58, cited at 542 F.2d 402 n.9.
66 Id.
"'United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58.
6 d
542 F.2d at 403.
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Because under the holding of the principal case the CAB must
seek judicial enforcement of any contested inspection demand and
submit to judicial review of its purposes, it will always be possible
for a carrier both to buy time and to learn precisely what the CAB
is looking for through the simple expedient of refusing the agen-
cy's initial demand for inspection. A court which expressed concern
lest it impose "delay and some loss of flexibility 7 * on the CAB
might have been expected to give more weight to this practical
effect of its decision.'
In seeking to delimit the government's authority to inspect cor-
porate records, and especially those of regulated carriers, the courts
face a difficult task of balancing competing interests. There is merit
in the statement that "so long as our carrier operations are rooted
in private enterprise there is a strong element of privacy"7 in at
least some types of carrier records. The Supreme Court has remind-
ed us that the "general warrant or writ of assistance [has been] odi-
ous in both English and American history."" But there is also merit
in the CAB's argument that in return for the privilege of engaging
in regulated public transportation, carriers have surrendered much
if not all of any expectation of privacy they might otherwise enjoy.'
It cannot be denied that corporate misconduct has become a
pressing problem in recent years, with closely regulated corpora-
tions sometimes found among the most flagrant offenders. No sug-
gestion was made in the principal case that United had attempted
or might attempt to conceal or destroy evidence of wrongdoing,
and none is made here. However, it may be questioned whether a
regulatory agency should be compelled to go to court to explain
what it is looking for and why before it can gain access to the files
of a regulated corporation. The more serious the problem under in-
70 542 F.2d at 402.
71 One potential set of problems was forestalled by the court of appeals' de-
cision. The CAB had argued that if it could only inspect those records required
to be kept and directly related supporting materials, it might be necessary to
promulgate new regulations requiring carriers to keep "many times the number
and variety" of records presently required. Brief for Appellant at 37. The statu-
tory construction settled on in the principal case should, at least, make any such
rulemaking unnecessary.
72 Burlington Northern, Inc. v. ICC, 462 F.2d at 288 (Leventhal, J,, on mo-
tion for rehearing), quoted with approval, 542 F.2d at 397.
73 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. at 207.
74 Brief for Appellant at 34-35.
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vestigation, the greater the temptation to conceal evidence will be.
The court of appeals' decision in the principal case raises as
many questions as it settles in an area where the courts have pro-
vided relatively little guidance to date. The conflict between the
ruling in Burlington Northern and that of the principal case ap-
pears to invite resolution by the Supreme Court. At least three out-
comes would appear possible: the Court might endorse the Bur-
lington approach, that of the principal case, or the still broader ap-
proach of Colonnade and Biswell. The CAB, however, has chosen
not to seek certiorari in the principal case."' Any further develop-
ment thus may have to await legislative action. Congress, should it
find its regulatory delegates unduly hampered by restrictive statu-
tory interpretations, may find it necessary to legislate a clear
answer to questions such as that raised by the principal case.
Martin Lowy
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IM-
MUNITY-The Imposition of the Civil Aircraft Use Tax Upon
Aircraft Owned by a State and Operated for Governmental Pur-
poses Is Unconstitutional as a Violation of the Principle of Inter-
governmental Immunities. State of Georgia, Department of Trans-
portation v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
The State of Georgia owned and operated a number of civil air-
craft which were used exclusively for state governmental functions;'
they were not used for the private benefit of any person or state
I1 Letter from Howard M. Schmeltzer, Enforcement Attorney, CAB, to Mar-
tin Lowy (July 1, 1977).
1 Out of a total of forty-five aircraft, thirty-seven were used by the State For-
estry Commission to aid in the detection, prevention, and treatment of forestry
diseases and the detection, prevention, and control of forest fires; two were used
by the State Game and Fish Commission for purposes of law enforcement,
coastal patrol, and the transportation of personnel in connection with the per-
formance of commission functions; one aircraft was used by the State Highway
Department for aerial photography in connection with the design, construction,
maintenance, and repair of state-aid roads and highways; five were reserved for
the transportation of State officials and employees solely for functions authorized
by the laws of the State of Georgia.
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official, nor were they used in the production of income. In 1971,
a federal tax,' pursuant to section 4491 of the Internal Revenue
Code, of $4,304 was imposed upon these aircraft. These monies
were deposited in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund which had
been created by the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue
Acts of 1970.
Georgia sought, but was denied, a refund of the tax by the In-
ternal Revenue Service. This action was then brought by the State
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. The State alleged that the tax was unconstitutional as a
violation of intergovemmental immunities; the United States argued
that the tax was a user's charge and, therefore, outside the scope
of intergovernmental issues and, in the alternative, that the tax did
not present an undue burden upon Georgia, thereby passing the
226 U.S.C. S 4491 (1970).
(a) Imposition of tax-A tax is hereby imposed on the use of any
taxable civil aircraft during any year at the rate of-
(1) $25, plus
(2) (A) in the case of an aircraft (other than a turbine-engine-
aircraft), 2 cents a pound for each pound of the maximum
certificated takeoff weight in excess of 2,500 pounds, or
(B) in the case of any turbine-engine-powered aircraft, 31
cents a pound for each pound of the maximum certificated
takeoff weight.
(b) By whom paid.-Except as provided in section 4493(a), the tax
imposed by this section shall be paid-
(1) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft described in section
4492(a)(1), by the person in whose name the aircraft is, or is re-
quired to be, registered, or
(2) in the case of a taxable civil aircraft described in section
4492(a)(2), by the United States person by or for whom the air-
craft is owned.
26 U.S.C. § 4492 (1970).
(a) Taxable civil aircraft.-For purposes of this subchapter, the term
"taxable civil aircraft" means any engine driven aircraft-
(1) registered, or required to be registered, under section 501(a)
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C., sec. 1401(a)), or
(2) which is not described in paragraph (1) but which is owned
by or for a United States person.
There is no dispute that the airplanes owned by the State of Georgia are required
to be registered under § 501(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and thus
fall within the definition of "taxable civil aircraft" as used in these two sections.
'Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703,
1711-1727; Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 236 (codified in
scattered sections of 4, 23, 26, 49 U.S.C.). Congress has charged that the fund is
to be used to develop airports, plan and construct airports, operate and maintain
air traffic control systems, air navigation, communications and other supporting
services for the airway system. 49 U.S.C. § 1742.
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test of intergovernmental tax immunities. Held, judgment for
plaintif: The imposition of the civil aircraft use tax on aircraft
owned by a state and operated for governmental purposes is un-
constitutional as a violation of the principle of intergovernmental
immunities. State of Georgia, Department of Transportation v.
United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. User's Charge or Tax.
The seminal issue posed by State of Georgia is whether the
aircraft registration excise tax, section 4491 of the Internal
Revenue Code, is a tax or a user's fee. If the excise tax is held to
be a user's fee the inquiry would then focus upon the reasonable-
ness of the charge.' If it is held to be a tax, however, the issue
becomes whether that tax is a violation of the constitutional prin-
ciple of intergovernmental tax immunities.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the basic
distinction between a user's charge and a tax. In Packet Co. v.
Keokuk' the Court held that in collecting wharfage rates, the city
of Keokuk, Iowa, was not levying a tax, which would have been
a violation of the constitutional prohibition that "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty or Tonnage.'"
The Court held that the city was merely imposing a charge for
services rendered to steamboats mooring and landing on wharves
constructed and maintained by the city. The Court said that a
charge for services rendered is not a duty or tax.' The decision
noted that building and maintaining a wharf for vessels is a service
which could be provided by a state, a city, or an individual, "and
when compensation is demanded for the use of the wharf, the
demand is an assertion, not of sovereignty, but of a right of prop-
4 The Supreme Court decisions concerning highway tolls are instructive. These
cases establish that the states are empowered to develop "uniform, fair, and prac-
tical" standards for this type of fee, McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
309 U.S. 176 (1940); Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931);
or flat fees which are not excessive, Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
595 U.S. 80 (1877).
'U.S. CoNsT. art. I, S 10, cl. 3.
195 U.S. at 84.
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erty."' In short, the charge represented a quid pro quo.'
In a more recent Supreme Court decision, Evansville-Vander-
burgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.," the Court
reaffirmed this principle. In a consolidated case, two municipal
airport authorities enacted ordinances imposing charges for each
passenger enplaning on a commercial airplane in order to defray
the costs of airport construction and maintenance. In upholding
the charge, the Court found that it was designed only to make the
user of the provided facilities pay a reasonable charge. Further-
more, since there was no suggestion that the charge did not ad-
vance the constitutionally permissible objective of having inter-
state commerce bear a fair share of the costs, the charge was up-
held." The decision also noted that exemptions from the charge
were based upon the degree to which the facilities were used.1'
For example, passengers were distinguished from other airport visi-
tors because the former group required the use of runway and
navigational facilities."
In State of Texas v. United States,"4 a federal "tax.'. was imposed
'Id. at 85.
'See also Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935), where
charges were aimed to defray the cost of insuring the safety and facility of
movement of vessels of harbor, and Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 596
(1884), where a charge was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the commerce power
and not an otherwise prohibited use of the taxing power, because the money col-
lected did not go to the "general support of the government" and was "but a
charge for services rendered."
10405 U.S. 707 (1972).
11 Id. at 722. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868), involving a state tax on
passengers passing through the state on stagecoach or railroad, is distinguished
on the grounds that the Nevada tax was charged without regard to whether the
State provided any facilities for those travelers who were required to pay the fee.
405 U.S. at 713.
11405 U.S. at 717-19. The balance of the decision dealt with the specific na-
ture of the charge: the Court found that the charge reflected a fair approximation
of the use of the facilities for whose benefit it was imposed, that it did not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce and travel, that it was not shown to be
excessive in relation to airport costs incurred by the taxing authority, and that
it was not in conflict with any federal policies furthering uniform national regu-
lation of air transportation. All of this suggests a possible analysis to be followed
in determining the validity of a user's charge.
11405 U.S. at 718.
'[1972] STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) (72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 16,048
(W.D. Tex. 1972), alf'd, [1973] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (73-1 U.S. Tax
Cas.) 5 16,085 (5th Cir. 1973).
1526 U.S.C. S 4261 (1970).
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upon all passengers of commercial aircraft, including employees of
the State of Texas engaged in official business. The monies from
this "tax" were placed in the Airport and Airways Trust Fund."
Upholding this assessment, the court found that the legislative his-
tory of both the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue
Acts of 1970 evidenced congressional intent that expansion and
improvement of the national airport and airway system should be, to
an ever increasing measure, borne by all users of the federal aviation
system. The court noted that Congress' goal was for the civil part of
the system to be self-sustained from air use taxes." The district court
endorsed the general notion that there should be a direct relation-
ship between the use of the system and the money generated to
meet the needs required by users. Furthermore, it was fitting that
the direct users bear the primary financial burden.18 The court
noted that Congress specifically intended to include even those
passengers who were state officials.1 The court concluded that the
"tax" was a charge for services rendered, representing a quid pro
quo and, as such was outside the scope of the intergovernmental
issues raised by the State.
In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States,"' the First
Circuit Court of Appeals considered section 4491, the same section
considered in State of Georgia, and it characterized money flowing
into the Airport and Airways Trust Fund as a user's fee. The court
held that a state was like any other user and should bear its share
1" During fiscal year 1971, Texas was to receive from this fund federal com-
mitments of $22 million. This was out of a total of $33,785,000 available for the
five state Southwestern Region and $170 million for the nation. [1972] STAND. FED.
TAX REP. (CCH) (72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 16,048 at 86,129 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
"7H.R. REP. No. 601, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3047, 3083 [hereinafter cited as H. REP. No. 601].
18 [1972] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 16,048 at
86,131 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
1' Id. Earlier law had provided exemptions to persons using transportation
furnished to the United States and to state and local governments. In terminating
this exemption, the House Committee on Ways and Means indicated that:
It did not seem appropriate to continue special exemptions for these
governmental . . . organizations since this tax is now generally
viewed as a user charge. In this situation there would appear to be
no reason why these governmental... organizations should not pay
their share of the use of the airway facilities.
See H. REP. No. 601, supra note 17, at 46; [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 3091.
"0548 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1977). See note 86 infra.
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of the cost of those facilities and services; the civil aircraft use tax
was properly assessed against the State. As in State of Texas, the
court of appeals primarily looked to the legislative history of the
Airport and Airway Development Act and Revenue Act of 1970
to find that Congress had intended a user's charge. The court, in
examining the essence of the assessment, decided that the term
"user charge" was an apt description: "The money thus raised...
is appropriated in advance to the users of the statute, and does not
go to the general support of the government."'" It concluded that
there was no logical reason why any state user should not pay its
fair portion of the costs.
This line of cases reveals the recognition that a user's fee and a
tax are two distinct forms of collected revenue: the user's fee is
basically devoted to support a specific activity-an activity from
which the party paying the revenue derives some service and bene-
fit; the tax is devoted to the general support of the government.
B. Intergovernmental Tax Immunities.
If section 4491 is viewed as a user's charge, the question of
intergovernmental tax immunities is irrelevant; however, if it is
viewed as a tax, the immunity question becomes vital. The basic
principles of intergovernmental immunities have long been estab-
lished: the taxing power of the United States may not be so exer-
cised as to impair the separate existence and independent self-
government of the states." The reason for the immunity of
instrumentalities of state government from federal taxation is
found in the necessary protection of the independence of the na-
tional and state governments within their respective spheresY
The leading case on intergovernmental tax immunities is New
York v. United States." The State of New York was operating a
mineral water bottling plant and selling the water. A federal tax
was imposed upon the profits of the operation. Announcing the
judgment for the Court, Justice Frankfurter suggested that the test
of state immunity from the tax should be whether the tax is dis-
criminatory. "[Slo long as Congress generally taps a source of
21548 F.2d at 36 (quoting The Head Money Cases).
2Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 482 (1869).
23Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934).
24326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely capable of being
earned only by a State: the Constitution of the United States does
not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a State."'
Chief Justice Stone, in a separate opinion, stressed the need for
an addition to the test. He urged that the Court should also deter-
mine whether such a nondiscriminatory tax unduly interferes with
the performance of state functions of government. "If it does, then
the fact that the tax is non-discriminatory does not save it.""
The Chief Justice recognized that the problem with using only the
Frankfurter formula was that a tax, even though nondiscriminatory
as to the subject matter, "may nevertheless so affect the State,
merely because it is a State that is being taxed as to interfere un-
duly with the State's performance of its sovereign functions of
government." ' Therefore, according to Chief Justice Stone, be-
cause a tax has the ability to infringe upon State sovereignty, even
a nondiscriminatory tax on a state must not unduly interfere with
its governmental functions.
Since New York v. United States the doctrine of State tax im-
munity has been limited in scope and strength." According to one
commentator, by the mid-1940s the doctrine of reciprocal inter-
governmental tax immunity had become an idea of questionable
validity;" apparently very few states ever believed their sovereign
status was sufficiently impaired by federal taxation to warrant the
Stone distinction.
In a more recent decision by a district court on immunity issues,
City of New York v. United States," a federal excise tax was im-
posed upon amounts paid for the air travel of city employees
engaged in official city business." In upholding the tax, the district
"Id. at 582.
Id. at 588.
17 Id. at 587.
8 See Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Immunities, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1945), and Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity,
58 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1945). See also J. Freeland & R. Stephens, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 274 (1972).
"McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment,
51 N.C. L. REV. 485, 493 (1973).
"1394 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1976).
" The excise tax provision in question here is I.R.C. S 4261. This is the same
tax that was involved in Texas v. United States, [1972] STAND. FED. TAX REP.
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court relied upon both the Frankfurter and Stone tests from New
York v. United States. It found no discrimination against the city
since all users of air transportation facilities were subject to the
tax.' The court also found no undue burden upon the city's
sovereign functions since there had been no showing of "actual
impairment"' of city functions resulting from the tax directly. The
decision indicated that unless a more convincing demonstration of
actual hindrance of state municipal instrumentalities were pre-
sented, there would be no such undue interference as to invalidate
a federal tax.
It can be seen, therefore, that the immunity doctrine has largely
been a difficult ground upon which to challenge a federal tax since
a state carries a heavy burden in demonstrating not only that the
tax is discriminatory but that it also unduly interferes or actually
impairs state governmental functions.
C. National League.
State of Georgia not only reached intergovernmental tax immu-
nity issues by treating section 4491 as a tax, but it also relied upon
a recent Supreme Court case, National League of Cities v. Usery, "
in finding that the tax presented an undue burden on the State and
its essential functions. In that case, various governmental organiza-
tions challenged the validity of certain amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act' which extended its minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to almost all employees of states and
their political subdivisions. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
held that insofar as the amendments operated to displace the states'
ability to structure employer-employee relationships in areas of
traditional governmental functions, they were not within the
authority granted Congress by the Commerce Clause. He stressed
(CCH) (72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 16,048 (W.D. Tex. 1972). The Texas court did
not reach intergovernmental issues since it treated the tax as a user's fee.
32 394 F. Supp. at 646.
" Id. This standard of "actual impairment" was outlined by McCormack,
supra note 29, at 493. In surveying intergovernmental immunities, he found
"any challenge to federal taxation of a state activity would require a showing
of actual impairment of state functions." The court in City of New York ex-
pressly relied upon this conclusion.
-426 U.S. 833 (1976).
- 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
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that Congress had sought to use its power in a fashion that would
impair the states' ability to function within a federal system.'
Thus far the application of National League has been cautious;
rarely has it been applied to issues outside of those relating to
state employment practices and the effect of federal legislation
upon them.' Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has obstructed
congressional intrusions into state employment practices, it has
yet to apply similar concern for federal assaults upon principles of
federalism in the area of intergovernmental immunities.' Finally,
related to the question of the scope of National League is its appli-
cation: does the case prohibit any federal legislation which has a
direct effect upon state sovereign functions, or does it prohibit only
that federal legislation which is outweighed by state interests?
The district court in Usery v. Board of Education of Salt Lake
City," one of the few courts to consider this problem, was not
436 U.S. at 844.
Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976) declined to apply
National League beyond those specific Fair Labor Standards Act amendments in
approving Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to enact other provi-
sions under the FLSA involving discrimination in pay based upon sex with re-
spect to city employees. In approving Congressional power to enact these equal
pay amendments, Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111
(N.D. Tex. 1976), also gave National League only mild importance; while con-
ceding that the Supreme Court case "does effect a modest resurrection of State
sovereignty," it strongly doubted that, in the absence of any further signals from
the Supreme Court, National League "is intended to generally and fundamentally
alter the balance of state and federal power." Id. at 114. It added that the case
"should be applied very conservatively in overturning social and economic policies
of Congress."
38In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), Chief Justice Burger, in dissent,
pointed to the Court's refusal to apply the principles underlying National League.
He regarded National League as an attempt "to arrest the denigration of the
States to a role comparable to the departments of France, governed entirely out
of the national capital." 427 U.S. at 375. Burger accused the majority of supply-
ing "inroads on the powers of the States to manage their own affairs" which
would only "complicate our system and centralize more power in Washington."
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), Justice Rehnquist declined to find
an infringement of State sovereignty in Congress' provision for private suits
against States or state officials to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In so
deciding, he approved the language of Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879),
which supported the expansion of congressional power with the corresponding
general diminution of state power:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. Indeed,
every addition of power to the general government involves a cor-
responding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.
Id. at 346.
u421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
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entirely certain which approach to adopt. At the onset it rejected
the direct effect theory, reasoning that if National League. were so
interpreted this would "undermine constitutionally and statutorily
recognized and protected individual fights in employment merely
because the federal legislation affects, in some manner, an integral
state function."* Such an absolute interpretation, it added, would
"derogate from the federal system by unduly restricting congres-
sional power" in areas such as individual rights."1 The court then
balanced the interests and found the national interest in preventing
arbitrary employment discrimination on the basis of age to pre-
vail.' Later in the opinion, however, the court retreated from its
otherwise strong approach and addressed the alternative rationale.
It found that because of the nature of the federal legislation in
question, there was no "direct" displacement of the state's freedom
to structure integral state operations. '
In Brown v. County of Santa Barbara," the direct effect test
was slightly more significant in the court's analysis. The test was to
ask what function the federal legislation attempted to regulate, and
if it was something essential to a state's separate and independent
existence then the federal legislation may be invalid. The case found
no such effect upon something essential, and it upheld the federal
legislation which "merely"' affected state decisions to pay employees
unequally on the basis of gender. Imposing the obligation not to
discriminate in wages based on sex "has a decidedly less direct
and intrusive impact on State governmental functions" than the
FLSA amendments in National League which touched an area
"essential to [the State's] separate and independent existence."'
By so holding, the court actually seemed to be balancing with a
special awareness of the subject matter involved, although couched
in terms of directness.
4 Id. at 719.
4 1 Id.
Id. See also Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
421 F. Supp. at 720.
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II. STATE OF GEORGIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
V. UNITED STATES
A. Tax.
By addressing intergovernmental immunity issues, the court in
State of Georgia impliedly held that section 4491 is a tax. The
United States argued, however, that the civil aircraft tax is not
a tax in the traditional sense, but instead a charge for services
rendered, and as such, is outside the scope of intergovernmental
tax immunity issues.47 The United States stressed the same points
made in State of Texas8 and Commonwealth of Massachusetts:"
Congressional intent is clear; section 4491 is a user's charge based
on the premise that all aircraft should pay a basic fee to use a sys-
tem from which they derive a benefit." Furthermore, the cost of
developing and maintaining an improved air transportation system
should be assumed by the direct users, whether they be private,
educational, or governmental.
The United States emphasized that there is a fundamental and
constitutional difference between a tax designed to produce federal
revenues for the general support of governmental benefits and a
user's charge designed to recoup part of the cost of governmental
facilities and services directly from those who benefit from them;"
section 4491 was in the latter category. To ensure that the air
user charges were expended solely for the expansion, maintenance,
and improvement of the air transportation system, the United
States demonstrated that the monies collected from the State were
deposited into a special trust fund; while Georgia would have to
pay a user charge of some $4,300, it would receive close to $15
million from that same trust fund."
47 Brief for Defendant at 12-14, State of Georgia v. United States, 430 F.
Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
48 See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra.
49 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
5"See H. REP. No. 601, supra note 17, at 40; [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEWS at 3085.
"I Brief for Defendant, supra note 47, at 13-14.
5 Supplemental Brief for Defendant on the Legal Question of Undue Inter-
ference at 5. The United States maintained that the Second Annual Report of
Operations under the Airport and Airways Development Act for fiscal year 1971
discloses that the $15 million figure was composed of planning grants and Airport
Development Aid Program grants.
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Neither the State of Georgia in its brief nor the Court in its
opinion mentioned this issue. No response was given to the United
States' contention that underlying section 4491 is a quid pro quo
outside intergovernmental immunity issues. The court, without
explanation, simply began to discuss intergovernmental immuni-
ties.
B. Reliance Upon National League.
As to the issue of whether National League-a case principally
concerned with the Commerce Clause- should be controlling in a
tax immunity case, the State found National League's applicability
from the actual language of the Supreme Court. The State pointed
out that Justice Rehnquist applied principles of intergovernmental
immunities to the area of interstate commerce with such "striking
force and clarity"' as to leave no doubt that such principles are
applicable in all respects to the area of federal taxation of states.'
The State added that an analysis of the opinion makes it clear that
the instant tax, section 4491, imposed by the federal government
upon the State exceeds the federal government's authority under
the federal system." Justice Rehnquist had, for instance, recognized
that the whole purpose of the immunity doctrine is to protect the
"essential role of the States."' To that end, the State argued that
there was no reason to limit the immunity docrine to Congressional
exercise of its Commerce Clause authority. The State urged that
the principles enunciated in National League applied with equal
force to the federal taxing power.' In addition, the State asserted
61 Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff on National League of Cities v. Usery at 2,
State of Georgia v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
"Such language includes:
This Court has never doubted that there are limits upon the power
of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when exercising its
otherwise plenary powers to tax or regulate commerce which are
conferred by Art. I of the Constitution.
426 U.S. at 842. Justice Rehnquist also recognized that the whole purpose of the
immunity doctrine is to protect the "essential role of the States in our federal
system." Id. at 844.
Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 53, at 2.
, 426 U.S. at 844.
'7 Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 53, at 5. However, not all the
language in National League supports the State's position:
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if
Congress seeks to affect the integral operations of state govern-
ments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the
19771
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that the Supreme Court embraced "whole-heartedly the immunity
doctrine"'" by using New York v. United States as strong authority
for the proposition that even a general nondiscriminatory tax im-
posed upon citizens and states alike could not be constitutionally
applied to a state's capitol, state-house, public school, revenue from
state taxes or school lands, or aircraft.
Absent from the United States' argument is the issue of whether
National League should apply at all to tax immunity issues. The
court as well apparently accepted the role of National League in
defining the undue interference of a federal tax, by noting that,
"[T]he parties seem to concede sub silentio that the National
League of Cities decision is dispositive of the instant action."5
In so relying upon National League, the court declined to apply
City of New York, which had demanded a showing of "actual im-
pairment," finding that because City of New York was decided
before Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League, the City of
New York reasoning was no longer applicable."0 State of Georgia,
in questioning whether the state was immune from the federal tax
turned to the tests presented by New York v. United States; since
there was no question that the tax did not discriminate, attention
was centered about Justice Stone's "undue interference" test, which
the court found to be defined entirely in terms of National League."
C. Undue Interference
The issue actually discussed by State of Georgia is how "undue
interference"-the Stone addition to the tax immunity test-is to
be defined. The State argued that the test of undue interference of
a federal tax upon state property or activities is the directness of
Constitution such as the Spending Power.
426 U.S. at 825 n.17. Presumably the same analysis would apply to the taxing
power. But cf. 426 U.S. at 843 n.14:
Surely the federal power to tax is no less a delegated power than is
the commerce power: both find their genesis in Art I, § 8. Nor can
characterizing the limitation recognized upon the federal taxing as
an "implied immunity" obscure the fact that this "immunity" is de-
rived from the sovereignty of the States and the concomitant bar-
riers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary federal
authority.
58Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 53, at 4.
"430 F. Supp. at 824-25.
01Id. at 824 n.1.
Id. at 825.
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such interference; since section 4491 imposed a direct burden and
effects a direct increase in costs to the State in performing its
governmental functions, it is unconstitutional. The degree of the
interference is insignificant, the key is whether such interference
exists at all.
In support of its position, the State pointed out that Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in National League contained a great deal of
language which spoke in terms of directness. For instance, in re-
calling the broad scheme of the federal system embodied in the
Constitution, he held that insofar as the challenged FLSA amend-
ments "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,"
such authority is not granted Congress by the Commerce Clause."
The State asserted that the quantity of financial burden is not
the key to whether a particular attempted assertion of power by
the federal government over the state is invalid. It also stressed
that the danger of the tax on its civil aircraft is that the federal
government, if authorized to impose any tax at all on an essential
state function, could impose one large enough to force relinquish-
ment by the State of important governmental activities." The
question is simply whether the federal government is regulating in
an area traditionally reserved for the State's exclusive discretion."
Not only does the literal language of National League support this
proposition, but the State maintained that the Supreme Court's
refusal to remand National League to determine the actual impact
of the FLSA amendments upon the states and cities further indi-
cates specific facts are unimportant.' The "dispositive factor" was
that Congress had attempted to exercise its authority in such a
6 426 U.S. at 852. Justice Rehnquist's opinion added at 855:
Congress may not exercise that [commerce] power so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions re-
garding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be
made.
" Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 53, at 6.
" Again the language of Justice Rehnquist seems to support an affirmative
answer: "Quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon the States and
their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner
in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their
citizens require." 426 U.S. at 847.
In referring to remand, the Court said: "We do not believe particularized
assessments of actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented."
426 U.S. at 851.
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manner as to regulate states in their "capacities as sovereign gov-
ernments. '"'
The United States, on the other hand, argued that the test pre-
sented by National League was quantitative and that the tax must
not be viewed in isolation but rather must accommodate other
factors in determining whether on balance the interference created
by the tax is in fact "undue." As recognized in State of Georgia, "a
great deal of Justice Relmquist's analysis is based upon the sub-
stantially increased cost which would be visited upon the states"'
as the result of the federal legislation.
Beyond the Supreme Court's discussion of increased costs, the
United States asserted that the Court would find undue interference
only when the federal tax is so substantial that it operates to
directly displace the state's freedom to control essential areas. The
United States argued that the substance of National League indi-
cates that undue influence exists only when there is a significant
impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies, which in
turn could cause "the forced relinquishment" of important state
governmental rights."' No evidence of such "relinquishment" was
made by the State, and the United States claimed that this failure
was a "potent indicator" that the tax was not so substantial as to be
"undue.""
The United States also insisted that the $4,300 tax be viewed
in light of both the total state budget and the benefits conferred
upon the state by federal expenditures in the area of aviation. Such
federal funds were derived from the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund and amounted to some $15.2 million of benefits to the State
426 U.S. at 852.
67430 F. Supp. at 825.
6 For instance, Justice Rehnquist devoted a great deal of attention to the im-
pact of the FLSA amendments upon California's highway patrol training program
in terms of increased costs of close to $750,000 per year. He noted that such
federal wage regulation would increase state costs and effect "a compromise
undoubtedly of substantial importance to those whose safety and welfare may
depend upon the preparedness of the California Highway Patrol." He also cited
two local governmental entities who would be forced to pay some $938,000
extra for fire and police protection without any proportional increase in services
rendered. 426 U.S. at 846-47.
"See Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief on the Legal Question of
Undue Interference at 1 & 2.
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of Georgia." When "undue interference" is viewed in a quantitative
light of balancing these economic considerations, added the United
States, the tax cannot be said to unduly interfere with the opera-
tions of the State.
The United States argued that a balancing approach is further
advanced by the way in which Justice Rehnquist distinguished his
holding in National League from his earlier decision, Fry v. United
States," which upheld the Economic Stabilization Act as applied
to State employers. Fry involved an "emergency measure" designed
to counter serious economic problems, and Justice Rehnquist
weighed such factors as the degree of federal intrusion into state
matters, the exigent national circumstances of an emergency justify-
ing such an intrusion, and the traditionally local nature of the
state activities that were to be nationally regulated. The United
States claimed that distinguishing Fry on the basis of an emergency
situation supported its argument that the Court will balance the
respective interests of federal and state governments in regulating
economic activity.
In further support of its position, the United States pointed to
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in National League, in
which the Justice said that the Court's opinion was essentially
adopting a balancing approach. Here the state's interest prevailed,
but in other areas, according to Justice Blackmun, such as environ-
mental protection, there would be no similar denial of federal
power, since the federal government has a demonstrably greater
interest, and state compliance with the federal standards would be
essential."
In finding the tax unconstitutional as applied to the State's
civil aircraft, State of Georgia did not accept the State's invitation
to define undue interference as any direct effect. Nor did it follow
the United States' suggestion to balance the amount of the tax
against the state budget and the benefits received by Georgia from
the trust fund into which the tax was paid. The court recognized
that National League "does not lend a great deal of light to the
70See Supplemental Brief for Defendant on the Legal Question of Undue
Interference at 5.
1 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
7 426 U.S. at 855.
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distinction which the instant parties propound.""m Instead, the court
engaged in a balancing analysis which relied entirely upon Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion. The decision focused upon his
illustration of environmental protection as an instance where ad-
herence to federal standards is essential in finding that the balanc-
ing test involved qualitative determinations as opposed to the de-
fendant's proposed monetary weighing. Commenting upon the
Blackmun example, the court said "the federal interest in uni-
formity in environmental regulation would exceed the state interest
in promulgating its own standards," and such would hold true
notwithstanding "the monetary impact which the federal statute
or regulation could have upon the states."' According to the court,
the essence of the problem is whether or not Congress has the power
to tax the entities through which a state carries forward its essential
functions. In the absence of certain circumstances such as an
economic emergency or the need to protect a pre-eminent federal
interest such as environmental preservation or discrimination, there
is no such power. "The question of whether or not this power
exists is not a question of degree. The power to tax in a particular
subject matter either exists or it does not exist."m
With this test in mind, the court in State of Georgia could "per-
ceive no federal interest of such magnitude warranting the imposi-
tion of a federal tax on the State."'7 ' A federal tax on the state civil
aircraft, advanced the court, does not rise to the level of a pre-
eminent federal interest. "Although the federal government does
have a peculiar interest in controlling the number and spacing of
incoming and outgoing flights, there exists no parallel overriding
federal policy in terms of being able to tax each and every flight.""
Failure to uphold the tax would not "destroy the efficacy of an
entire federal program.""8
Despite its use of the balancing test, at one point the decision
did turn away from its Blackmun approach and looked at the
possible impact of section 4491 upon the State. It found that while
73 430 F. Supp. at 825.
7" Id. at 825 n.3.
75 id.




$4,300 could not stop the use of civil aircraft and carried only a
"modest pecuniary force," it still could be "significant enough to
affect the State's basic policy choices as to whether or not
air travel is the most efficacious means through which to ac-
complish its governmental obligations.""' In its conclusion, how-
ever, the court returned to its former basis and held that when a
negligible federal interest is balanced against the potential to affect
State policy and the ability to structure its own essential functions,
"such power does not exist.""
State of Georgia is unsettling in several respects. Presently on
direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court," the decision
presents several issues for the Court to review. One is the absence
of any mention by the court of the tax or user's charge issue. This
is a problem not to be passed over, especially in light of the pre-
vious decisions which held similar and even the identical tax to
actually represent a quid pro quo and not a tax. This question
presents a probable ground of appeal. Not only is there firm pre-
cedent for finding the "tax" a user's fee," but reliance on the user
charge presents a more orthodox basis upon which to decide the
case than intergovernmental immunities. Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court might not feel the issues of intergovernmental tax
immunities are fully justiciable or ripe:" few cases have raised
these questions, and disposing the case on user fee grounds may
well be a way to once again avoid the issue.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 825 n.2.
"i United States v. Georgia, No. 77-16 (filed July 1, 1977).
12 State of Texas v. United States, [1972] STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH)
(72-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 5 16,048 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts v. United States, 548 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir. 1977).
3In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936),
Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion, set forth a number of instances where
the Supreme Court will avoid passing upon those issues which are within its
jurisdiction. Among those was:
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has
found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter.
See also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 (1910); Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 199 (1908).
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Another problem is State of Georgia's "sub silentio" acceptance
of National League as dispositive of a tax immunities case. This
too presents an outstanding feature in light of the vast collections
of district court cases which have declined to apply National League
even beyond the limited scope of the FLSA amendments. Such
acceptance is not likely to pass unquestioned by the Supreme Court.
This could provide an excellent ground upon which to dispose of a
potentially controversial outcome. Should National League be re-
jected as dispositive there would perhaps be a return to the City of
New York approach of demanding a showing of "actual impair-
ment." This would effectively negate any contribution National
League might have made to the analysis of the tax immunity doc-
trine. On the other hand, should the Supreme Court agree that the
case does apply to these issues, the door will be open for states to
assert strong defenses against any federal intrusions.
The manner in which State of Georgia relies upon National
League is almost as confusing as the Supreme Court's opinion in
National League itself. The district court seemed to willingly adopt
a Blackmun-balancing approach, but then it speculated upon the
actual impact which may directly touch the State. Perhaps it was
merely being cautious and deciding in the alternative to reach the
same conclusion. Also troubling is the court's balancing, since
there does not seem to be traditional weighing of one interest
against the other. Rather there seems to be simply a search for a
pre-eminent federal interest. The analysis seems to run as follows:
if there is to be any federal regulation of an essential state func-
tion, it must involve an area where the federal interest is pre-
eminent. The analysis clusters around the nature and subject matter
of the federal legislation, not the nature of the federal legislation
compared to the nature of the essential state function. The degree
of intrusion is then unimportant; where there is no federal interest,
no intrusion can exist in the face of a regulation upon an essential
State function. One wonders whether the converse can be true:
when the federal interest is in fact pre-eminent and the federal
power does exist, can federal regulation exist to such a gross ex-
treme that the federal government could obliterate essential state
functions?
State of Georgia is not faced with this question of extreme use
of federal power. Perhaps new protections for states will have to
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be fashioned should this situation arise. In any event, State of
Georgia's basic adoption of the Blackmun approach seems sensible
since it manages to accommodate both the state's fundamental in-
terests and federal objectives." This approach effects "a new tool
of analysis which allows recognition of renewed federalism and
protects the states from dominance by Congress."' A court can
seek to balance the congressional interest against the states' tenth
amendment right to freedom of decision-making in certain areas.
When states are regulated in such a manner that an essential
state function might be touched, the court could balance the states'
tenth amendment interests against whether "the federal policy
sought is crucial or essential to the protection of valid constitutional
guarantees.""
Mark Daniel Powers
"4 Federal policies such as those in pollution, as suggested by Justice Blackmun
in National League, and age discrimination, as in Brown v. County of Santa
Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977), will certainly prevail.
" Beaird and Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National
League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35, 73 (1976).
6Id.
Since this issue went to print, the Supreme Court decided Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. United States, 548 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1977), and found § 4491
to be a user's fee. 46 U.S.L.W. 4280 (March 29, 1978). The effect of this deci-
sion will be to overrule the holding of the district court in State of Georgia, Dep't
of Transp. v. United States.
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